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ABSTRACT
The Role of the Conditionality of EU Membership in Migrant Criminalization  
in the Western Balkans
The EU’s responses to migration challenges exceed the territory of its member 
states. Through externalization of border control they spill over into the countries of 
the Western Balkans (WB), which is crossed by one of the most important migration 
routes from the Middle East and Africa to the EU. While the WB countries show indif-
ference towards migrants and consider them an “EU problem”, the latter conditions 
European integration with the establishment of migration management structures 
similar to those in the EU. The transposition of the EU acquis also increases the crim-
inalization of migrants, which highlights the problematic role of the EU and national 
legislators in WB in relation to the fundamental rights of migrants.
KEY WORDS: migration, detention, migrant criminalization, European Union,  
Western Balkans
IZVLEČEK
Pomen pogojevanja za članstvo v EU na področju kriminalizacije migracij  
v državah Zahodnega Balkana
Odzivanje Evropske unije (EU) na migracijske izzive presega ozemlje njenih držav čla-
nic. Prek pozunanjenja mejnega nadzora se preliva na ozemlje Zahodnega Balkana 
(ZB), ki ga preči ena najpomembnejših migracijskih poti s Srednjega vzhoda in Afrike 
proti Evropski uniji. Medtem ko države ZB ne kažejo interesa za migrante in jih štejejo 
za problem EU, ta evropsko integracijo pogojuje z vzpostavitvijo struktur upravljanja 
z migracijami, podobnimi tistim v EU. Prenos prava EU pa povečuje tudi stopnjo kri-
minalizacije migracij, kar kaže na problematično vlogo EU in nacionalnih zakonoda-
jalcev na ZB v razmerju do temeljnih pravic migrantov.
KLJUČNE BESEDE: migracije, pridržanje, kriminalizacija migracij, Evropska unija,  
Zahodni Balkan
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THE CREATION OF THE MIGRATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM  
AND THE IMPACT OF THE EU
In the past, the institutional development of migration management in the Western 
Balkan (WB)1 countries was driven by the countries’ own internal needs when they re-
ceived refugees fleeing the wars of the 1990s. In the last decade, however, this devel-
opment has mostly been driven by external factors such as prospective European Un-
ion (EU) membership. The international actors which are most intensively involved in 
the development of asylum institutions and procedures in the region are UNHCR (Fei-
jen 2008: 413), which played a crucial role in setting up the basic asylum mechanisms 
at the beginning of the new millennium, and the EU, which is seeking to “promote 
its model of border management as a first step in the process of integrating these 
countries into the EU” (Celador, Juncos 2012: 202). EU incentives to create migration 
management mechanisms have led to the creation of a WB “buffer zone” (Wolff 2008), 
serving to minimize irregular migration to the EU (Celador, Juncos 2012: 202; Trauner 
2007; Luli 2015). At the same time, incentives to increase the migration management 
capacity of WB functions as the externalization of the EU’s border control (Marin, 2011; 
Spijkerboer, 2017; de Vries, Guild, 2018). This paper focuses on whether and how the 
conditions for EU membership, the EU’s support for institutional development in asy-
lum and migration management and hence the externalization of migration control to 
the Western Balkans is causing migrant criminalization in this region.
METHODOLOGY
In order to determine the extent of migrant criminalization in the Western Balkans, 
the research focused on several aspects of migration management structures. The 
first focus was on the legislation and how it has changed in the last ten years – have 
new definitions of offences related to migration and border crossing been added to 
the law? Have the sanctions foreseen for these offences changed? Is irregular cross-
ing of state borders a crime or a misdemeanour? The second focus was on detention 
– who funded the construction of new incarceration facilities? What is the law and 
practice of detaining asylum seekers? The third focus was on return – what kind of 
return is taking place, on what grounds and where to? Is there evidence of push-
backs, i.e. informal forced returns?
1 The term Western Balkans is both geographic and political. It was initially used by US and 
European policymakers to describe the part of the Balkan Peninsula that remained outside 
of NATO and the European Union since the early 1990s. It includes all seven states that were 
formed after the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia) together with Albania, which has been emerging from 
international isolation (Oxford Bibliographies 2017). This paper and the research on which it 
is based covers all of the countries in question except for Slovenia and Croatia, now EU mem-
bers, and Albania, which was not a part of the former Yugoslavia. 
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The analysis focused on five countries in the WB region – Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. The research was done on the basis 
of a literature survey, the conducting of seven skype interviews with represen tatives 
of national or international organizations working in these countries in the field of 
migration, and interviews with five legal consultants who are experts in the field of 
migration, one for each country. The selection of respondents and experts who partic-
ipated in data collection was based on their expertise. The anonymity of the interview 
respondents and experts is intentional. The collection of data took place between De-
cember 2017 and May 2018. The data is kept in protected electronic format. 
FROM “LAISSER-FAIRE” TO SYSTEMATIC DETENTION AND PUSHBACKS 
The countries of the WB region, complex and diverse in itself, are responding differ-
ently to incentives offered by the EU. But what they all have in common is that re-
forms are visible mostly in relation to formal building of structures, procedures and 
institutions (Wolff 2008). As Grabbe points out, the EU agenda for the new member 
states is not so much about strengthening shared values as it is about building the 
countries’ capacities to participate in the common market and implement similar 
policies (2014: 42). The fact that the WB countries have not become a safe haven for 
migrants and asylum seekers can be seen from our fieldwork results. The outcomes 
show that some countries take a relaxed approach, register a relatively low number 
of people and maintain limited accommodation capacities, while others take the po-
litical pressure seriously but also use relatively harsh methods which are questiona-
ble from the perspective of basic procedural and human rights standards. 
Overall, the level of criminalization strongly depends on the exposure of an in-
dividual country to migration on one hand, and on the political and public attitudes 
towards migration on the other. It is therefore not possible to draw the simple con-
clusion that those countries that are most exposed have also resorted to the most 
restrictive responses or more repression. There are numerous examples of countries 
that have been highly exposed to migration but have not resorted to intensive crim-
inalization (e.g. Serbia), as well as countries that in the past have not been exposed at 
all, but have showed a very strict approach which functioned as a political statement 
aimed at supressing migration (e.g. BiH). The countries’ policies have also been fluid, 
swinging between tolerant attitudes towards transit migration in one period and 
restrictions and border closures in another. 
Serbia, for instance, was strongly affected by the refugee crisis from the very be-
ginning when the number of arrivals began to rise in 2014. About 800,000 migrants 
and refugees from the Middle East and North Africa crossed the country in 2015. 
Responding to EU demands to safeguard its borders and consequently to reduce the 
arrivals of refugees, in the early stages of the mass migration movements the Serbi-
an government introduced a registration system for people entering the country. 
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The registration system began as a loose arrangement and the authorities gradually 
introduced stricter and more precise controls in response to criticisms expressed by 
several EU member states (EI5; EI6; EI7). Since migrants perceive Serbia as a transit 
country (Lukić 2016), as on average they spent less than two days on its territory dur-
ing the crisis, the authorities mostly avoided any kind of intervention which would 
cause or even incentivize the prolongation of their stay (EI5; EI6; EI7). 
Until September 2015, there was no legal framework for differentiating people in 
need of international protection but not willing to stay in Serbia from those who were 
willing to stay. However, in September 2015 the Serbian government issued a decree 
introducing the issuance of “transit certificates” to people who expressed the inten-
tion to seek asylum. These certificates, issued from December 2015 to February 2016, 
gave the holder the right to remain in the country legally for 72 hours (Article 22(1) 
of the Asylum Act, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 109/2007; Decision 
on Issuing a Certificate of Having Entered the Territory of Serbia for Migrants Com-
ing from Countries Where Their Lives are in Danger, Official Gazette, No. 81/2015). In 
order to properly initiate the asylum procedure, holders had to report to the accom-
modation centre indicated on the document within 15 days to officially submit the 
asylum request and benefit from the reception conditions (EI5; EI6; EI7). After Hun-
gary completed the border fence and the EU-Turkey agreement on stricter controls 
on migratory movement from Turkey was signed, Serbia’s approach changed as well. 
The Serbian government started focusing on border security, which also meant that 
people entering the country were no longer able to leave as easily. The EU’s plans to 
externalize border control (cf. Badalič 2018) and at the same time use border security 
as a condition for EU membership were thus clearly manifested in Serbia (ibid.). 
The approach of the Macedonian government was a mixture of even more ex-
treme securitization aspects on one hand and more lenient de-securitization meas-
ures on the other. In harmonizing its migration management policy with the EU 
acquis, the government opted for further restrictions. However, in 2015 when the 
authorities on the Balkan route decided not to stop migrants and refugees2 who 
were on their way north-west, the Macedonian government followed the Serbian 
example and provided short-term transit certificates to those who entered irregu-
larly. For this purpose, amendments to the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protec-
tion entered into force in June 2015 that allowed asylum-seekers to declare their 
intention to claim asylum to any police officer (EI3, EI4). These amendments provided 
for more flexibility in claiming international protection by removing the restrictive 
previous requirement, according to which applications for asylum had to be made 
at the border when entering the country or at the nearest police station. Instead of 
being held in police custody in order to be transferred to the reception centre, the 
migrants’ and refugees’ stay in Macedonia was regularized for a period of 72 hours, 
2 This refers to the 2015/16 period, when Germany decided not to impose the Dublin rules for 
Syrian refugees. For more on this subject see Kogovšek 2017. 
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with full freedom of movement, and they were allowed to formally submit their asy-
lum application within the prescribed time limit. However, most of the people who 
received such 72-hour certificates left the country. Out of the one million people 
who transited Macedonia during the “refugee crisis”, only 100 applied for asylum 
(EQ3). Later, when the EU started to pressure the Western Balkan countries to close 
the route, the Macedonian government resorted to different kinds of measures – de-
tention and pushbacks.
While one could observe sharp policy changes in the countries on the main 
migration route, such as Macedonia and Serbia, the countries off the main migra-
tion route have been slowly but steadily sharping their responses. Montenegro and 
Kosovo, for instance, have seen a slight increase of new arrivals as the conditions 
on the main migration route have tightened, and have consequently adjusted their 
policies to the new situation.
Migrant criminalization can take several forms and shapes. In our research we 
have identified some of these forms in the Western Balkan countries, including but 
not limited to: new definitions of felonies and misdemeanours being added to the 
law, irregular border crossing being transformed from a misdemeanour to a felony, 
increased numbers of migrant detainees, increased capacities of detention centres, 
informal collective expulsions (pushbacks), imposition of penalties for misdemean-
ours on potential asylum seekers, criminalizing the provision of services to migrants 
and imposing new obligations on non-immigration authorities to report migrants to 
law enforcement.
Expansion of Definitions of Misdemeanours
All Western Balkan countries covered by our research now have a longer list of felo-
nies and misdemeanours related to migration. This is a direct result of the harmoni-
zation of the countries’ migration legislation with the EU acquis. In BiH, for instance, 
the number of definitions of minor offences in the field of migration has slightly in-
creased in the last decade (ES1) and in 2015 new types of misdemeanours appeared 
in the law as a result of the adoption of the former Aliens Act (BiH Official Gazette No. 
88/2015, 17. 11. 2015). In Kosovo, a number of new misdemeanours have been added 
to the legislation on foreigners, and out of 34 definitions of offences identified, 24 
are very recent, all originating in the law of 2012 (ES2). In Macedonia, 30 offences re-
lated to migration were identified in the law, some having been added recently (ES3). 
In Montenegro, in total 61 definitions of offences have been identified in relation to 
migration and border crossing, of which 11 were added in 2011, 2013 and 2014 (ES4; 
also Foreigners Law, Official Gazette of Montenegro, No. 56/14 and Criminal Code 
of Montenegro, Official Gazette of Montenegro, No. 40/2013 and 56/2013). Similarly 
in Serbia, several changes have taken place in the recent years as new definitions 
of offences were added by the legislator to the list of offences related to migration 
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and border crossing, while the sanctions for existing offences became stricter (ES5). 
These developments show a very clear trend of increased legislative criminalization.
Macedonian law in the field of migrant criminalization contains a unique feature 
in that the Macedonian Foreigners Law includes both misdemeanours and felonies, 
which is rare in the WB region. In the legal tradition of the WB region, felonies were 
always covered by a single law – the penal code. Felonies, unlike misdemeanours, 
were never introduced in other pieces of legislation. The Macedonian example 
showcases a situation where both criminal and administrative sanctions related to 
migration are grouped in one document, which is in itself an explicit manifestation 
of crimmigration (Stumpf 2006), i.e. the phenomenon of the merging of administra-
tive and criminal law elements. 
Irregular Border Crossing – Felony or Misdemeanour?
The question of whether irregular border crossing is considered a felony or a misde-
meanour is considered to be a litmus test for determining the level of migrant crim-
inalization in an individual country. Among the researched countries only Kosovo 
defines irregular border crossing as a felony. While this conduct is not considered a 
felony but “only” a misdemeanour in the rest of the region, for which only a fine is fore-
seen, Kosovo’s penal legislation foresees a fine or imprisonment of up to six months 
for unauthorized border crossing (Criminal Code of the Republic of Kosovo, Code No. 
04/L-082, 2. 4. 2012). A closer look reveals that that Kosovo’s legislation is a copy of 
American law. In contrast, only four EU member states define irregular border crossing 
as a felony. Hence in the Western Balkan region Kosovo stands out in the sense that it 
is not only the EU that has a strong influence on how migration and asylum policy is 
developing, but also the United States. In other countries in the region where irregular 
border crossing remains a misdemeanour, only aggravated forms of this offence are 
considered a felony. In Montenegro, for instance, irregular border crossing is prosecut-
ed as a felony if the non-citizen crossing is armed or crosses by force (EQ4). In Macedo-
nia, providing assistance to irregular border crossers is considered a felony (Foreigners 
Law, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No. 35/2006 as amended).
Detention of Migrants and Asylum Seekers
Detention is one of the key restrictive policy measures used for migration control and 
deterrence. All of the countries analysed have operating detention centres and are 
resorting to detention of both irregular migrants and (in most cases) also of asylum 
seekers. There are, however, specific features in how detention is used in each of the 
countries. BiH, e.g., is characterized by systematic detention of all irregular non-na-
tionals. A measure formally called “placement under surveillance” is prescribed with 
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an aim of the expulsion of people irregularly present in BiH (Art. 118(1) Aliens Act). 
Even though the authorities are not allowed to detain asylum seekers, half of all asy-
lum seekers were not identified as such at their first contact with the authorities. 
Instead, they were treated as irregular migrants, placed in detention and could only 
apply for asylum from the immigration detention centre, as provided by Article 33 of 
the Asylum Act (BiH Official Gazette No. 11/2016, 19. 2. 2016). The fact that they are 
claiming asylum does not lead to their release. Instead, the people remain detained 
until the expiration of the “surveillance measure” (EQ1). 
Even though the European Court of Human Rights in Saadi v UK (2008) endorsed 
the administrative detention of asylum seekers, specifically ruling out the require-
ment of necessity, the detention of asylum seekers, especially if it is systematic, is 
subject to criticism (O’Nions 2008). Critics of this policy claim that it is in breach of 
Article 31 of the 1951 Geneva Convention which prohibits the penalization of refu-
gees entering or staying irregularly. They emphasize that restrictions on movement 
should not be applied to refugees in general but only in exceptional cases (EI1, EI2). 
The following statistics show the number of non-nationals detained in the de-
tention centre per year and reflect the increase in the number of those apprehended 
on BiH territory. In 2017, a total of 860 non-nationals were placed under surveillance 
in the centre, which represents an increase of 166.53% (ibid.: 41) and constitutes the 
highest number of detentions per year in the last decade.
Table 1: Detention statistics in BiH (2008–2016) 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Detainees 198 191 312 218 453 236 218 193 311 860
Source: EQ1
My previous research from 2014 showed that the aim of such restrictive detention 
policy was to deter new arrivals. At the same time, systematic detention was only 
possible because the numbers were low and hence manageable (Kogovšek Šalam-
on 2015). This finding has been recently confirmed. After the release of EU-Turkey 
statement on 18 March 2016 (European Council 2016), the closure of the border be-
tween Hungary and Serbia (2015/16) and stricter border controls between Croatia 
and Serbia, the main migration route moved south-west, to Albania, Montenegro, 
BiH and Croatia. Consequently, in 2018 BiH saw a considerable increase in the num-
bers of transiting migrants and refugees.3 Thousands of irregularly present migrants 
and refugees are now stranded on the territory of BiH, near the city of Velika Kladuša, 
without access to asylum procedure and basic care (Kramberger, 2018; Videmšek, 
3 In this paper I do not make a clear distinction between migrants and refugees. As Jalušič 
points out, the legal division between them is unsubstantiated and artificial (2017: 531).
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2018).4 They experience difficulties with moving onwards as first the Slovenian, and 
then also Croatian authorities have been carrying out pushbacks to BiH territory 
(Amnesty International 2018). They are not provided housing or assistance by the 
authorities, but they are also not detained as there is no space for them.
A policy of systematic detention was also pursued by Macedonia while it was still 
possible given the new realities of increased migration flows. In 2015, when the num-
bers of arrivals to Macedonia started to rise, the approach of the Macedonian author-
ities towards migration which included systematic detention became unsustainable. 
The Gazi Baba detention centre located in the Macedonian capital Skopje was heavily 
overcrowded. Return was not possible due to the lack of cooperation with Greece, 
with which Macedonia was in a dispute over its name.5 At the same time the only in-
terest of the transiting migrants was to leave the country as soon as possible and con-
tinue their way north-west. As the data shows, more than one million people arrived 
in the European Union irregularly from the Middle East and North Africa in 2015/16 
(European Commission 2017), a large majority of whom travelled through Macedonia. 
The table below shows the drop in the number of people held at the detention centre. 
Table 3: Detention of irregular migrants in Macedonia per year
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017
Detainees 896 1,346 389 100*
*The official statistics for 2017 were not available at the time of the information was being collected. According 
to expert estimations there were approximately 100 detainees in 2017.
Source: EQ3
Even though it is less crowded than it used to be, the detention facility in Gazi Baba is 
still in operation. In 2015, due to its overcrowding, many international and domestic 
human rights watchdogs pressured the Macedonian Government to close it down 
(AIS, 2015a and 2015b) and, as a result, all the detainees were released and allowed 
to seek asylum (EQ3). 
This de-securitization trend soon changed. The majority of irregular migrants 
are now once again being detained and are not given access to asylum procedure 
4 In August 2018, the European Commission provided support of EUR 6 million to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to improve its capacity for identification, registration and referral of third-coun-
try nationals crossing the border, provide accommodation and basic services for refugees, 
asylum seekers and migrants and strengthen the capacity for border control and surveil-
lance, hence also contributing to the prevention of and fight against the trafficking of human 
beings (European Commission 2018b).
5 Greece did not allow Macedonia to use the name of Republic of Macedonia because of the 
northern Greek region also named Macedonia. Hence Macedonia the country was forced to 
use the acronym FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) after its declaration of 
independence in 1991. In 2018 Macedonia and Greece reached an agreement on the name 
(Northern Macedonia instead of FYROM). 
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prior to release. The majority of asylum seekers (56 % in 2016 and 58 % in 2017) were 
allowed to apply for asylum only after release from immigration detention (ibid.).
In contrast, Serbia never resorted to the systematic detention of migrants de-
spite being faced with mass transit migration. Like all other WB countries, Serbia also 
has just one detention centre, but according to common opinion, detention is not 
the normal way of treating migrants in Serbia, as the policy of tolerance and open-
ness declared by the authorities was widely promoted by national media (ibid.). As 
is also evident from the statistics below, there is a decreasing trend in detaining mi-
grants and a very small percentage of new arrivals are detained.
Table 6: Detention of asylum seekers in Serbia per year compared to the number of 
people who expressed the intent to apply for asylum 
Year 2015 2016 2017
No. of detainees who expressed intention 
to apply for asylum 
474 43 29
Total number of expressions of intent 487,124 12,821 6,199
Source: EQ5
Montenegro also did not embark on a systematic detention approach. Until 2017 no 
asylum seekers were detained in Montenegro as this was not allowed by law. While 
the Asylum Law guaranteed full freedom of movement for asylum seekers, in the 
past there was a problem of the de facto limitation of the movement of minor asylum 
seekers. Before opening of the asylum centre in 2014, minor migrants and asylum 
seekers were being placed in the Ljubovic migrant detention centre even in cases 
where the legal conditions for detention were not met. The Montenegrin govern-
ment claimed that there are no other more appropriate reception facilities available 
for unaccompanied minors. This issue was later resolved and for a few years Monte-
negro has stood out in the region for its non-incarceration asylum policy. However, 
this did not last long: in 2018 legal provisions were introduced which now allow the 
detention of asylum seekers (ibid.). With this development Montenegro is joining all 
the other countries in the region that already provide for restriction of freedom of 
movement for asylum seekers under legally defined conditions.
While asylum seekers may only be detained as of 2018, the detention of irregular 
migrants who did not apply for asylum was already possible in Montenegro. Until 
2013 Montenegro did not have a migrant detention centre. The placement of irregu-
lar migrants who were apprehended in the territory of Montenegro was solved vari-
ously, on a case-by-case basis, by placing them in facilities such as NGO shelters and 
hotels, or by renting private residential facilities with security provided by the police. 
The number of detainees remained steady as there had been no increase in the legal 
grounds for detention of irregular migrants in the recent years. 
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Table 4: Detention of irregular migrants in Montenegro per year 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Detainees 219 75 42 112 132 234
Source: EQ4
Kosovo is also not among countries that practise the mass incarceration of migrants. 
The seemingly harsh legislative picture with irregular border crossing being defined 
as a felony, which might give an indication that Kosovo is tough on migrants and ref-
ugees, is not reflected in this area, as detaining asylum seekers is not practised at all 
in Kosovo (EQ2; also Law No. 04/L-219 on Foreigners, Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Kosovo, No. 35, 5. 9. 2013). The only detention centre for foreigners in the country 
started functioning in June 2015. It is not used for asylum seekers, but for irregular 
migrants for the purpose of the deportation procedure. As evident from the statis-
tics below, even the number of migrants detained remains relatively low.
Table 2: Detention of irregular migrants in Kosovo per year
Year 2013 2014 2015* 2016 2017 2018**
Detainees 0 0 47 78 42 26
*From June 2015 when the Detention centre for foreigners was fully operational until the end of the year the 
number of irregular migrants detained was 47.
**Up to 12 June 2018. 
Source: EQ2
In the recent years, the detention capacity has mostly increased in all of the states. 
The states have either opened new detention centres (e.g. Montenegro, Kosovo), or 
have increased the number of beds at the existing centres. In BiH in 2008 the deten-
tion centre’s capacity was increased from 40 to the current 120 beds (BiH 2018). In 
Serbia the current capacity of the detention centre in Padinska Skela of 66 beds will 
be increased to 100 beds (EQ5). 
Based on these findings, no single trend in migrant incarceration in the Western 
Balkans can be identified. There are a number of different practices and approaches, 
indicating that the policy approach depends on various factors such as EU pressure 
(which correlates with the scope of transit migration), the country’s detention ca-
pacities, the level of repression that otherwise exists in the country, and the trust of 
the authorities in detention being an effective tool of prevention and deterrence of 
irregular migration.
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Funding for Detention Centres
Another issue in the region that should be highlighted in the context of the condi-
tioning of EU accession is the provision of funding for the construction or renovation 
of detention centres. The BiH detention centre began operating in 2008, when the 
former Law on Foreigners, which allowed foreigners to be placed under surveillance, 
came into effect (BiH 2009). Its construction was funded by the EU fund “Instrument 
for Pre-accession Assistance” – IPA (EQ1). As in the case of BiH, the construction of the 
detention centre in Montenegro, used for incarceration of irregular migrants, was 
financed by an IPA 2008 project titled “Support to Migration Management in Mon-
tenegro” which provided for 50% co-financing from the European Union (EQ4). The 
reconstruction of the centre in Kosovo was similarly supported by EU funds (EQ2). 
Here it should be added that despite the low numbers of detainees in Kosovo, the 
issue of detention and the fact that the detention facility was renovated with EU 
funds are of particular importance. Namely, there are very few returns taking place 
from Kosovo, as the country has signed very few useful readmission agreements that 
would enable returns. This is relevant as the only allowed purpose of detention un-
der the EU Directive 2008/115/EC is the prospect of return. If the possibility to return 
is absent, detention is not legally justifiable and does not make sense. Hence I argue 
that the use of EU funds for detention that serves no legally acceptable purpose is 
highly illegitimate. 
Unlike in most of the other WB countries, the renovation of the detention centre 
in Serbia will not be funded by the EU, but by the Swiss Embassy in Belgrade and the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) (EQ5). There are plans to increase the 
detention capacity, not by building a new detention centre but by increasing the 
number of beds and creating a separate section for women. While on one hand the 
provision of funding may improve the living conditions and procedures within the 
existing centres, it may also provide an incentive to build and operate a centre in 
the first place. Thus it needs to be taken into account that by funding the construc-
tion of detention centres the EU is contributing to migrant criminalization. Since 
systematic detention in BiH is particularly problematic from the fundamental rights 
point of view, that fact that the EU is funding such a detention centre should be of 
particular concern.
Pushbacks
Even though they are highly problematic from the aspect of human rights and 
constitutional guarantees, pushbacks are becoming a more and more frequent 
phenomenon in Southeast Europe (HRW 2016; ECRE 2018). Pushbacks have al-
ready been reported in the region, in particular from Macedonia and Serbia. From 
19 November 2015 until 31 May 2017, according to monitoring organizations, the 
Macedonian authorities pushed back 10,377 refugees and migrants to Greece. 
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Following the final closure of the Balkan route on 18 March 2016, pushbacks in-
creased significantly and continued throughout 2017 (EQ3). Pushback practices 
have also been confirmed by the Macedonian authorities (ibid.). Serbia has joined 
the group of the countries that carry out informal pushbacks to its neighbours 
(EI5; EI6; EI7). There are reports of such pushbacks to Macedonia and Bulgaria from 
2016 and 2017. At the same time, it is experiencing pushbacks to its own territory 
from Hungary and Croatia (EQ5). 
Pushbacks, for which there is no universally accepted definition, are general-
ly characterized as informal collective expulsions (Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy) 
of people who irregularly enter a country back to the country they entered from, 
through the application of procedures that take place outside legally defined rules 
in protocols or agreements signed by the neighbouring countries. In pushbacks, 
access to seeking asylum is usually restricted, and police violence is often used to 
execute them. Pushbacks are often informal, including in the sense that even the 
authorities of the neighbouring (“receiving”) country are not informed about them. 
Pushbacks are problematic for a variety of reasons, e.g. there is no democratic or 
judicial control over these processes (as there is no decision to appeal against); there 
is no differentiation between people who are in need of protection and those who 
are not; they enable returns to jurisdictions with the risk of torture, inhumane and 
degrading treatment and punishment; and there is a lack of documentation of the 
procedures. If pushbacks are accompanied by police violence, the lack of documen-
tation and evidence that pushbacks took place and that individuals were in contact 
with the police render the recourse to legal remedies and redress for the people 
affected nearly impossible. 
Sanctioning Migrants for Misdemeanours
While the legislative situation resembles those in the rest of the WB region, a specific 
widespread practice of sanctioning migrants for misdemeanours was reported in 
Serbia. During 2015 when the numbers of mass arrivals were at their peak, the Ser-
bian Ministry of the Interior was initiating misdemeanour proceedings for irregular 
entry or stay against people who could be prima facie refugees, as most of the sanc-
tioned individuals came from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, and the sanctions were 
being imposed by the misdemeanour courts. People were sanctioned according to 
the Law on Foreigners (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 97/2008), State 
Border Protection Law (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 24/2018) and 
Misdemeanour Law (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 65/2013, 13/2016 
and 98/2016 – Constitutional Court Decision). In the recent years the statistics show 
that this practice has decreased. 
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Table 5: No. of sanctions issued by misdemeanour courts in Serbia against potential 
refugees per year
Year 2015 2016 2017
No. of sanctions 9,134 2,221 920
Source: EQ5 
The recognition that the practice of sanctioning people for irregular entry is prob-
lematic if used against people who are seeking protection has been highlighted by 
the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) in Serbia, a state mechanism mandated to 
supervise the treatment of people in detention in line with the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention against Torture, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
The Serbian NPM issued recommendations to the police and misdemeanour courts 
to terminate this practice and training was carried out to equip the state officials 
involved with knowledge about the Geneva Convention standards on non-penali-
zation of refugees (EQ5).
THE EFFECTS OF EU CONDITIONALITY ON MIGRANT CRIMINALIZATION 
Based on our research outcomes we can conclude that not all severe forms of mi-
grant criminalization are overwhelmingly present in the Western Balkans region. 
For instance, assistance to migrants is not criminalized. In only one out of the five 
countries analysed (Kosovo, which is heavily influenced by the US) is the crossing of 
borders considered to be a crime punishable with imprisonment (i.e. a felony), while 
in all others this is still considered a misdemeanour, which is also the most common 
situation among the EU member states. Also, being a migrant is not an aggravating 
circumstance in sentencing for crimes unrelated to migration.
However, many other indicators of migrant criminalization are present in the re-
gion, and they are on the rise. In many of the countries analysed, EU funds are used 
for the construction or renovation of detention centres, which not only increases 
the minimum standards in these buildings but also the number of people who can 
be detained. The EU is exercising pressure on countries to conclude readmission 
agreements which facilitate return. Non-immigration authorities (health or schools) 
in general are not obliged to report immigrants to the police. There are a few excep-
tions, e.g. in Kosovo, public or private healthcare institutions that admit foreigners 
for treatment are obliged to inform the nearest police station within twenty-four 
hours that they have treated an irregular migrant. Further, specific crimmigration 
problems have been identified in each country analysed: BiH with its systematic de-
tention, Kosovo with defining irregular border crossing as a felony, Macedonia with 
the pushbacks and large-scale incarceration practices, and Serbia with sanctioning 
of prima facie refugees for minor offences and pushbacks. 
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While increased border policing prevents mass border crossings, it also allows 
for pushbacks, which are prohibited by international law. The visa liberalization that 
promoted change in the Western Balkans (Fererro Turrión 2015: 18) and eased the 
life of nationals of the WB countries on one hand, increased the criminalization of 
people arriving in and transiting these countries on the other. It is crucial to ensure 
that future liberalization processes place more emphasis on the non-security re-
lated aspects of these societal and political changes, including those that concern 
other vulnerable groups such as people from conflict torn areas seeking protec-
tion. As EU accession, security, border control, institution-building and introduc-
tion of technologies for purposes of border surveillance are top priorities for the 
candidate and potential candidate countries, universal human rights has become 
a secondary concern. It is questionable whether this is acceptable in the process in 
which countries are striving to become members in a club which praises itself for 
being an area of “freedom, security and justice”. It is also questionable what kind of 
message this is sending to the candidate and potential candidate states – does this 
club care how migrants and refugees are treated? This is particularly problematic 
since the EU is already losing the status of a guarantor of stability and democratic 
institutions (BiEPAG 2016). It is also questionable whether this is the right way of 
preparing the EU candidate countries for membership – are they going to be able to 
abide by high human rights standards expected from them when they become EU 
members? And more importantly, are they going to participate in the solidarity and 
burden-sharing mechanisms in the field of migration and asylum, as is expected 
today across the EU? 
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POVZETEK
THE ROLE OF THE EU MEMBERSHIP CONDITIONALITY AT MIGRANT 
CRIMINALISATION IN THE WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES
Neža KOGOVŠEK ŠALAMON
Odzivanje Evropske unije (EU) na migracijske izzive presega ozemlje njenih držav 
članic, saj se prek pozunanjenja mejnega nadzora ta preliva tudi in predvsem na 
ozemlje držav Zahodnega Balkana (ZB); tam teče ena najpomembnejših migracijskih 
poti s Srednjega vzhoda in Afrike proti EU. Medtem ko države Zahodnega Balkana ne 
kažejo interesa za migrante in jih smatrajo za problem EU, ta evropsko integracijo teh 
držav pogojuje prek vzpostavljanja institucij in postopkov za obravnavo migrantov, 
podobnim tistim v EU. Prenos prava in ukrepov EU pa povečuje tudi stopnjo krimina-
lizacije migracij, saj nove norme vsebujejo tudi sankcije, ki jih njihovi pravni sistemi 
prej niso predvidevali. 
Izsledki raziskave na Zahodnem Balkanu niso pokazali vseh najhujših oblik kri-
minalizacije migracij. Nudenje pomoči migrantom, npr., ni kriminalizirana. Le v eni 
od analiziranih držav (na Kosovu, kjer pripravo politik močno navdihujejo Združene 
države Amerike) je nedokumentiran prehod državne meje kaznivo dejanje, ki se kaz-
nuje s kaznijo zapora. V drugih državah regije, kot je to najpogosteje tudi v državah 
članicah Evropske unije, pa je to le prekršek. Prav tako dejstvo, da je storilec nekega z 
migracijami nepovezanega kaznivega dejanja migrant, pri določanju višine sankcije 
ni oteževalna okoliščina. Kljub temu pa nekateri drugi dejavniki – ti so v porastu – 
kažejo na kriminalizacijo migracij.
V številnih analiziranih državah so centre za pridržanje zgradili ali obnovili s po-
močjo sredstev EU, kar pa ne izboljšuje samo bivanjskih razmer, temveč vpliva tudi 
na povečanje števila pridržanih. EU države spodbuja k sklepanju sporazumov o vra-
čanju, te pa omogočajo deportacije. Uradi, ki v regiji niso pristojni za migracije, na 
splošno nedokumentiranih migrantov, razen nekaterih izjem, niso dolžni prijavljati 
policiji. Na Kosovu, npr., morajo zdravstveni zavodi, kjer nedokumentirani migranti 
poiščejo pomoč, po zakonu te prijaviti policiji. Po posameznih državah so bili iden-
tificirani še drugi specifični pojavi krimigracije: v Bosni in Hercegovini sistematično 
pridržanje vseh neregularnih migrantov, tudi če ti želijo zaprositi za azil, v Srbiji in 
Makedoniji nezakonita množična prisilna vračanja ter v Srbiji množično sankcioni-
ranje prima facie beguncev zaradi nezakonitega prehoda državne meje. Ti pojavi, 
ki so v veliki meri posledica pogojevanja za vstop med članstvo EU, kažejo tako na 
problematično vlogo EU kot tudi nacionalnih zakonodajalcev na Zahodnem Balkanu 
v razmerju do temeljnih pravic migrantov.
